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nder its founding treaty,  the Eurozone Stability Fund (ESM) may provide stability 
support to its member countries in financial difficulty in the form of loans, by   
purchasing their bonds in primary and secondary debt markets, by providing 
precautionary financial assistance in the form of credit lines, and by financing the 
recapitalisation of financial institutions through loans. In June 2012, the eurozone summit 
decided that the ESM should also be able to recapitalise banks directly, in order “to break the 
vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”. In December 2012 the European Council 
further agreed that the building blocks of the banking union would consist of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the possibility 
for the ESM to recapitalise banks directly.  
The ministers of finance and the economy of the eurozone have now agreed on the main 
features of a new ESM instrument for the direct recapitalisation of euro area banks 
(Eurogroup, 2013) and on a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions 
(Council of the European Union, 2013). 
The new ESM instrument will enter into force only after the SSM is effectively in place and 
the legislative proposals for the SRM and Deposit Insurance directives are finalised by 
Council and Parliament; in all likelihood, therefore, well into 2014. This accommodates 
widespread demands for a delay – not only by Germany – and is somehow also at variance 
with the urgency of the eurozone summit decision last year. The truth is that, once again, as 
soon as financial markets tensions begin to ease, institution-building also slows down, and 
with it the reduction in market fragmentation.  
Utilisation of the new ESM instrument will be subject to strict conditions, in line with the 
instructions of the eurozone summit. Accordingly, it will only be made available when the 
requesting member state cannot help its banks on its own without endangering the 
sustainability of its sovereign debt, aid is indispensable to the eurozone’s financial stability, 
and the financial institution concerned is undercapitalised (in breach of CRD IV prudential 
requirements) and unable to attract sufficient capital from private sources. In order to 
preserve the top credit rating of the ESM, it has also been decided that the available funds 
under the new instrument must not exceed euro €60 billion – not an insignificant sum, but 
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hardly sufficient when there is a need to intervene for several banks and across several 
member states. It may be recalled that market participants apparently consider a ceiling that 
is double the amount consistent with the ESM’s top rating. 
The decision to grant the capital injection will be subject to thorough due diligence of the 
institution’s balance sheet quality and loss-absorption capacity, in order to assess its 
continuing viability and need for restructuring. It will only proceed after an adequate capital 
contribution by shareholders (capital write-down) and creditors (debt conversion into equity 
or write-offs) of the beneficiary institution, in line with the proposed directive on resolution 
(discussed below). In addition, the requesting member state will be required to inject capital 
into the distressed institution as required to bring its common equity (CE Tier 1) up to its 
legal minimum (4.5% of risk weighted assets under the CRD IV rules), as well as more 
broadly to participate in the capital injection, alongside the ESM, for an amount equivalent to 
at least 20% of the total public contribution in the first two years, and 10% thereafter. These 
provisions entail that the ESM assistance does not cover ‘legacy’ debts – one of the ‘red lines’ 
drawn on the negotiating table by (potentially) creditor countries. 
It is envisaged that the ESM will intervene by purchasing common equity (CET 1 capital) 
and will acquire strong rights of involvement in the institution’s business decisions and even 
choice of management – while ensuring, as the text goes, “a careful balancing between 
influence by the ESM and the maintenance of independent commercial business practices”, 
so as to leave open the possibility of a return of the institution to “market functioning”. 
The system for financial assistance to ailing banks is based on the broader foundation of the 
principles that have been agreed upon for the resolution of ailing banks within the member 
states of the Union and that, once adopted as a directive, will guide national legislation in 
this matter. A separate Commission proposal, to be published shortly, will cover the creation 
of the SRM, as mandated by the December 2012 European Council.   
Under the directive just agreed upon, all members states will be required to entrust their 
resolution authority with the power to sell part or all of a business; establish a bridge 
institution to manage the ‘good’ activities of a bank; transfer impaired assets to an asset 
management vehicle (the ‘bad’ bank); impose losses (bail-in) on creditors with an order of 
seniority, starting with shareholders and unsecured creditors.  
Two main features are worth stressing in the final compromise. The first is that certain types 
of liabilities, including secured liabilities and covered bonds, would be permanently 
excluded from bail-in, while deposits would have preference status in the creditors’ pecking 
order, but would not be excluded. According to the official text posted by the Council, this 
also applies to deposits under €100,000 (which would only have preference over other 
deposits). This provision makes a run on deposits more likely should a bank seem unable to 
stand on its own. It is also likely to encourage an increase in the ‘encumbered’ share of 
banks’ assets (i.e. the share pledged as a guarantee for bond issuance), which can make the 
return to unsecured funding more difficult and “leave banks reliant on liquidity support by 
the ECB for longer than warranted” (European Commission 2013, p. 26)    
The second feature worth noting is that national authorities maintain some discretion to 
exclude liabilities from bail-in for reasons such as the need to avoid contagion or to ensure 
the continuity of critical functions (interbank liabilities and liabilities arising from 
participation in payment systems are always excluded).                   
On the whole, establishing common principles for the resolution of ailing banks is a 
necessary foundation of the banking union, in order to eradicate moral hazard from the 
system, and the proposed directive should therefore be welcome. However, the text that has 
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unwelcome uncertainty as to the real scope of the new rules in the different national 
jurisdictions, while the lack of depositor preference in the bail-in pecking order may result in 
destabilisation.  
As for direct recapitalisation of banks by the ESM, the proposed system appears not only 
highly intrusive but it also places a considerable burden of aid to the failing institution on the 
member state, raising doubts about its ability to “break the vicious circle between banks and 
sovereigns”. It also displays a profound mistrust of anyone in need of assistance; hardly the 
remedy to restore confidence among market participants. The emphasis is on individual 
institutions, leaving little room to address a generalised need for strengthening bank capital 
as a result, for instance, of a protracted recession affecting banks economy-wide – as many 
believe is the case in the eurozone today (European Commission, 2013; IMF, 2013, and Benin 
& Huizinga, 2013). The conditions imposed on the requesting member state and the 
distressed institution are very harsh, so that resorting to the new instrument will probably be 
delayed as long as possible; in all likelihood raising the eventual cost of the rescue.  
A world of difference, in sum, from the approach taken in 2008 by Secretary Paulson of the 
US Treasury with his Capital Purchase Programme (CPP). The CPP was designed to bolster 
the capital of ailing institutions, in extremely adverse economic conditions, so as to release 
the flow of credit to the economy and restore confidence. To this end, the US Treasury 
initially committed $250 billion, and eventually invested about $205 billion, to provide 
capital to 707 financial institutions throughout the country. Against the capital injections, the 
Treasury received preferred (non-voting) stock yielding a 5% dividend for the first five years 
and 9% thereafter, but there was no deadline for the investment and little intrusion into the 
banks’ business decisions. As of April 30, the Treasury has recovered more than $222 billion 
from CPP from dividend income and repayments and expects to recover additional funds.                
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